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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
HUGH LEONARD W 0 0 D,
JOSEPH EARL MARTIN,
JOSEPH PAUL MARTIN,
JAMES WALTON,
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alias
alias

Case No.
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Defendant and.Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent adopts the Statement of Facts of Appellant. The issues raised on appeal go not to the facts but
to the law.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE INFORMATION SUFFICIENTLY CHARGED THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE; ALLEGATION OF OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY
ALLEGEDLY STOLEN IS NOT REQUIRED
UNDER SHORT STATUTORY FORM PROVIDED BY SECTION 77-21-47, U. C. A. 1953. THE
ORDER REQUIRING APPELLANT TO ANSWER IN THE DISTRICT COURT WAS DULY
MADE AND SIGNED BY THE COMMITTING
MAGISTRATE.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
I
TO GRANT APPELLANT A MISTRIAL.

POINT III
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR
DISMISSAL AND FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT
SINCE POSSESSION OF PROPERTY RECENTLY STOLEN SHALL BE DEEMED
PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF GUILT. THE
MATTER OF EXPLANATION OF SUCH
POSSESSION WOULD ORDINARILY BE A
QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY.
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POINT IV
THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL ACT OF UTAH
IS CONSTITUTIONAL; IT DOES NOT OFFEND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS OF LAW, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH, NOR THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA.
POINT V
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN
SENTENCING ;-AFTER JURY FOUND APPELLANT GUILTY OF GRAND LARCENY
AND THEREAFTER FOUND HIM GUILTY OF
HAVING BEEN TWICE BEFORE CONVICTED
OF FELONY, THE IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE AS PROVIDED FOR BY HABITUAL
CRIMINAL STATUTE WAS PROPER.

POINT VI
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN THE JURY.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INFORMATION SUFFICIENTLY CHARGED THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE; AL- ,
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LEGATION OF OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY
ALLEGEDLY STOLEN IS NOT REQUIRED
UNDER SHORT STATUTORY FORM PROVIDED BY SECTION 77-21-47, U. C. A. 1953. THE
ORDER REQUIRING APPELLANT TO ANSWER IN THE DISTRICT COURT WAS DULY
MADE AND SIGNED BY THE COMMITTING
MAGISTRATE.
Appellant relies upon the case of State v. Jensen, 83
Utah 452, 30 P. 2d 203, for his contention that the information did not charge an offense by reason of a failure to allege ownership of the property taken. At the time that
decision was rendered (May 10, 1934), the short statutory
form of pleading now provided in our Code of Criminal
Procedure was non-existent. Section 77-21-47, U. C. A.
1953, now provides :
"The following forms may be used in the cases
in which they are applicable: * * * LarcenyA. B. stole from C. D. * * *"
Further, as to ownership, as provided by Section 7721-16, U. C. A. 1953, an information or indictment need
contain no .allegation of the ownership of any property, unless such allegation is necessary to charge the offense under
Section 77-21-8, U. C. A. 1953; the later section permits
reference in the information or indictment to any statute
creating the offense charged and provides also that in
determining the validity or sufficiency of such information,
regard shall be had to such reference. The complaint in the
instant case refers to the statute creating the offense of
I
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grand larceny and we submit that the accused was indeed
fully informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
made against him. This court has said, in substance, that
by conformance with the statute, i.e., 77-21-8, by citation
of, or reference to, the section creating the offense, the
court and the defendant will be sufficiently apprised of
what was intended to be charged so a plea could be entered,
defense prepared and penalty be known. State v. Spencer,
101 Utah 274, 117 P. 2d 455; rehearing denied, 101 Utah'
287, 121 P. 2d 912. At the expense of substantial justice,
Appellant here seeks to interpose an artificial nicety.
Appellant also contends that the committing magistrate
made and signed no order requiring the Defendant to answer in the District Court to the offenses contained in the
information. This contention is erroneous; an examination
of the original complaint discloses, on the back thereof, the
following indorsement:
"It appearing to me that the offense in the
within Complaint mentioned has been committed
and that there is sufficient cause to believe the within named Hugh Leonard Wood guilty thereof, I
order that he be held to answer to the same and
that he be admitted to bail in the sum of Five Thousand Dollars and is committed to the Sheriff of Salt
Lake County until he gives such bail or is legally discharged.
/s/ J. PATTON NEELEY,
City Judge and Ex-Officio
Justice of the Peace."

The accused was duly bound over and held to answer
in the District Court by a magistrate having jurisdiction to
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investigate the charge and to make a determination as to
probable cause to believe an offense had been committed
and defendant was guilty thereof.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO GRANT APPELLANT A MISTRIAL.
The court did not err in refusing to grant Appellant a
mistrial as claimed under Appellant's Point II, for the following reasons :
1. That part of the information containing allegations
of prior felony convictions under which Appellant was
charged with being an habitual criminal was not read to the
jury in trying the principal charge of grand larceny. Nor
was the jury ever informed at any time during the trial on
the principal charge that Appellant was also charged with
being an habitual criminal.
While it is true that the jury learned, during the course
of the trial on the prinicipal charge of grand larceny, that
Appellant had been convicted theretofore of other felonies,
this knowledge came to the jury during the regular course
of cross-examination, the propriety of such cross-examination to be discussed infra at "2", hence 76-1-19, U. C. A.
1953, stating: The "Jury shall not be told of the previous
convictions of felony," was not violated thereby.
That portion of 76-1-19 above quoted is an injunction
against a formal reading to the jury of that part of the
information containing the charge of being an habitual
criminal during the trial of the principal charge. That it is
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also an injunction preventing the prosecution from crossexamining Defendant with regard to his conviction of prior
felonies as a test of his credibility as a witness, which would
seem to be a contention of Appellant, is not sanctioned by
the authorities.
2. It is basic in our law that the defendant in a criminal action may be questioned with regard to his prior convictions of felony, as affecting his credibility as a witness,
and if he falsifies with respect to such conviction, he may be
impeached as any other witness. 78-24-9, U. C. A. 1953:
Duty to Answer Questions-

"* * * But a witness must answer as to the
fact of his previous conviction of felony."
In interpreting the above code citation, the Supreme
Court, in State v. Johnson, 76 Utah 84, 287 P. 909, said:
"A witness as affecting his credibility, may be
asked if he had not previously been convicted of a
felony, and the kind or name of the felony, but not
as to details or circumstances of it; and if the Witness denies the conviction, according to the weight
of authority, he may be contradicted by the record
of a Court of competent jurisdiction showing the
conviction."
See also
State v. Hougensen, 64 P. 2d 229;
State v. Murphy, 68 P. 2d 188;
State v. Velsier, 159 P. 2d 371;
State v. Crawford, 201 P. 2d 1030.
Since the Appellant upon cross-examination admitted
one prior conviction (Tr. 106), but denied specifically two
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other convictions (Tr. 109), it is pertinent to point out that
the State's attorney is not limited to questioning Defendant
on only one prior conviction, as contended by Appellant at
the trial and by implication in his brief on appeal.
The function of the inquiry into prior convictions is not
fulfilled if inquir;v is confined to one prior conviction. If
prior convictions affect the credibility of a witness, it follows that both the number and the recency of said convictions is material to a jury's determination of the witness's
present truthtelling.
The statute quoted in the beginning of this paragraph
says he must answer to the fact of his "previous conviction
of felony." The absence of the article "a" in the phrase
underlined indicates a plural rather than a singular situation; moreover there is nothing in the statute or the governing cases on the subject specifically limiting the inquiry
to one prior conviction. Rather, cases from other jurisdictions indicate the opposite to be true. In State v. Little, ·
154 P. 2d 772, an Oklahoma case. decided in 1945, the court
held:
"When a defendant takes the witness stand, the
prosecution has the right to cross-examine him with
the same latitude as any other witness. * * *
he may be interrogated concerning other convictions
for crime." (Emphasis added.)
And in People v. Richardson, California Court of Appeals, First District, decided in 1946, 169 P. 2d 44, the
court said, at page 52 :
"In this state the testimony of a witness may be
impeached by proof that he has suffered the prior
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conviction of a felony. * * * This rule applies
to a defendant who testifies in his own behalf in a
criminal trial notwithstanding the fact that such
evidence tends to prejudice him in the eyes of the
jury. * * * The nature of the crime or crimes
of which he was convicted is a proper subject of
inquiry in establishing the fact of his conviction."
Finally, upon a denial by the defendant of convictions,
the prosecution has the right to introduce the record of the
court of the jurisdiction under which the former conviction
was had, to contradict the witness, as indicated in the Johnson case cited supra. In the case at bar, when the Defendant denied the two prior convictions, the State's attorney
put on evidence of the said convictions and it is this conduct
to which Appellant now excepts.
We think the argument presented herein answering
Appellant's Point II is also determinative of Appellant's
Point V and those parts of Point VI dealing with the alleged
violation of Appellant's rights as relating to fair trial
guaranteed by the Constitution and to alleged misconduct
of prosecution on the matter of habitual criminal charge.

POINT III
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR
DISMISSAL AND FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT
SINCE POSSESSION OF PROPERTY RECENTLY STOLEN SHALL BE DEEMED
PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF GUILT. THE
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MATTER OF EXPLANATION OF SUCH
POSSESSION WOULD ORDINARILY BE A
QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY.
In a recent decision of this Court, State of Utah v.
Benito E. Vigil, . . Utah . . , ... P. 2d ... , the Court said:

"* * * looking at the evidence * * *
we find that one of the bags stolen * * * was
found in defendant's hotel room. Two different
police officers testified that the defendant stated to
them that the bag was his * * * . Section 7638-1, provided that:
"'* * * Possession of property recently stolen, when the person in possession fails
to make satisfactory explanation, shall be deemed prima facie evidence ·of guilt.'
"Here the suitcase was not only found in defendant's possession but he asserted ownership
thereto. The jury could reasonably find from this
evidence that he was in possession of this property,
that it was recently stolen and that he made no satisfactory explanation of such possession. Under this
statute this constitutes prima facie evidence of guilt.
* * *" (Emphasis added.)
In the case at bar, the stolen property, at least a part
of it, was found in Appellant's possession. Police Officer
Butcher testified that Appellant stated it belonged to him
(Tr. 58). Wilson, the cab driver, so testified (Tr. 77).
Detective Reeder testified that Appellant said it belonged
to him (Tr. 83). Appellant, admittedly, testified otherwise,
but, the jury did not find his explanation satisfactory.
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POINT IV
THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL ACT OF UTAH
IS CONSTITUTIONAL; IT DOES NOT OFFEND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS OF LAW, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH, NOR THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA.

~·

~·

,•

No useful purpose would be served by a lengthy discussion or citation of numerous authorities to be found holding contrary to the views expressed in the argument of
Appellant. The statute, 76-1-18, U. C. A. 1953, has on several occasions stood the test of constitutionality in this
Court. Section 76-1-18, reads, in part, as Appellant contends, as follows :
"Whoever has been previously twice convicted
of felonies, sentenced and committed to any prison,
* * *." (Emphasis added.)
Section 76-1-19 reads, ·in part:

::.-;

1:.

"In charging a person with being a habitual
criminal the complaint * * * shall allege the
felony committed within the state of Utah and shall
allege the two or more convictions of felony relied
upon by the state of Utah; * * * " (Emphasis
added.)
In view of the wording of these statutes and particularly with regard the phrases "sentenced and committed
to any prison" and "the two or more convictions of felony
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relied upon by the State of Utah," Respondent is not inclined to accept Appellant's contention that the legislative
intent was to restrict the application of this law to those
cases wherein the accused had ·been twice before convicted
of felony in this State.
"Felony" is defined by statute, Section 76-1-13, U. C.
A. 1953, reads:
"A felony is a crime which is or may be punishable by death, or by imprisonment in the state
prison. * * *"
Appellant's argument to the effect that the word "felony" has no legal meaning is, admittedly, a novel one.
Possibly it has merit as to the definition of the word itself
and it may be conceded here that each and every state may
by statute define its local legal meaning. However, the
test is not the "act" that constitutes the "felony" but is
rather the punishment to be inflicted for the "crime" calling
for incarceration in a state prison. To put it another way;
in a prosecution under the Habitual Criminal Act, proof of
conviction of two or more offenses which are under the
law of the jurisdiction where committed, punishable by imprisonment in a state prison, combined with conviction for
a felony committed in this State, satisfies the requirement
of the statute.
POINT V
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN
SENTENCING;-AFTER JURY FOUND APPELLANT GUILTY OF GRAND LARCENY
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AND THEREAFTER FOUND HIM GUIL'rY OF
HAVING BEEN TWICE BEFORE CONVICTED
OF FELONY, THE IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE AS PROVIDED FOR BY HABITUAL
CRIMINAL STATUTE WAS PROPER.
In Point VIII of his brief, Appellant complains of being
sentenced to a term of fifteen years as an habitual criminal
and contends that he should have first been sentenced for
the crime of grand larceny, i.e., a sentence of one to ten
years, before the court could impose the greater penalty of
not less than fifteen years as provided by the habitual criminal statute. For this contention, Appell~nt cites no authority and. Respondent thinks his argument falacious.
The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho said, on this
particular question :
"The third conviction of a person of a felony
does not constitute a crime. The section merely provides for punishment, on the third conviction of the
accused, in excess of that which might have been inflicted on him had he not been twice previously convicted."

In Re Bates, Idaho, 1943, 125 P. 2d 1017.

s

See also cases there cited. Again in 1942, the Idaho
Court said:
"The purpose of the statute is to increase the
penalty for the third conviction of a felony, * * *."

State v. Prince, 64 Idaho 343, 132 P. 2d 146.
It appears from research that this is a matter of first
impression iD: this jurisdiction; however, Respondent sub-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
mits that the very purpose of the statute is to provide for
the imposition of the greater penalty based upon conviction
of habitual criminality. The imposition of the greater sentence in lieu of the lesser was proper.
POINT VI
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN THE JURY.
Appellant complains of instructions, numbered two and
seven, as being prejudicial to his rights to a fair trial; and
especially objects to a portion of Instruction Number Two.
Said instruction was given as follows:
"If you find from the evidence and beyond a
reasonable doubt that someone committed the larceny as charged in the information, and that thereafter the defendant was found in possession of the
recently stolen goods and if you also find that the
defendant failed to give a satisfactory explanation
of his possession, there would arise an inference that
the defendant committed the larceny himself, and
this inference may be considered along with all of
the other facts and circumstances of the case in determining whether or not you are convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt of the -defendant's guilt." (Emphasis added.)
The part given emphasis is that to which Appellant
objects. Respondent directs the Court's attention to the
case of State v. Hall, 105 Utah 106, 139 P. 2d 228, wherein
this Court speaking through Mr. Justice Wolfe said:

"* * * since the term 'prima facie' is used
in the statute in the sense of presumptive evidence
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(State v. Potello, 40 Utah 56, 119 P. 1023) it would
have been more proper to instruct the jury in substance that if it found from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that someone had committed the
larceny as charged, that the defendant was found in
possession of the recently stolen goods and that it
further found that he failed to give a satisfactory
explanation, there would arise an inference that the
defendant committed the larceny and that this inference might, with all other circumstances, be considered in determining whether or not the jury was
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt."
We submit that Instruction Number Two as given in
the instant case is, in substance, compatible with that suggested as proper by this Court. However, if it be granted
but not admitted, that this instruction complained of was
not proper, then Respondent relies also on the case of State
v. Hall, supra, for the proposition that the giving of the instruction was not prejudicial error, since the jury was
further instructed that the State still had the burden of
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant generally states that Instruction Number
Seven was also prejudicial but says not why; not knowing
what Appellant holds for this objection, Respondent is reluctant to speculate thereupon. We submit, without argument, that the instruction was proper.
,

Generally, as to both of the instructions objected to,
the record shows merely that:
"The defendant in this action excepts to instruction number two, and the defendant objects to
instruction number seven for the record" (Tr. 141).
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We suggest that the portions of the instructions objected to were not sufficiently pointed out and that, unless
the whole of the instruction was bad, such an exception
would be unavailing for the purpose of having any particular part reviewed and passed upon on appeal. Ryan v.
Beaver County, 82 Utah 27, 21 P. 2d 858, 89 A. L. R. 1253.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Assistant Attorney General
ALDON J. ANDERSON,
District Attorney
">D. CHRISTIAN RONNOW,
Deputy District Attorney

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

